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Distributive Policies and Economic Growth: 





In an infinite-horizon, endogenous growth model a capital ir 
vestment subsidy tax is considered to investigate if distribut 
towards the non-accumulated factor o f production (labour) r 
and if capital income taxes are bad instruments to finance in 
sidies. The paper identifies conditions under which the tax scheme is better 
for growth than other distorting tax schemes. In the model a ’ left-wing’ 
(pro-labour) government acts growth maximizing and distributing income 
towards labour raises growth. A  ’right-wing’ (pro-capital) government’s 
preferred policy is not growth maximizing under the tax scheme, but may 
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Many theoretical models on growth and distributive policies suggest that 
increasing taxes for redistribution slows down growth. See e.g. Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994), Bertola (1993) and many others. This conclusion is 
reached by the following line of argument: Some taxes are optimal for the 
private incentive to invest and so optimal for the accumulated factor of 
production and growth. In comparison, a government that redistributes 
resources towards the non-accumulated factor of production levies higher 
taxes, causing lower steady state growth. The result crucially depends 
on the tax arrangement. Clearly, any policy that subsidizes investment 
is good for growth as is usually noted by the same authors. That raises 
the question how the subsidies are financed and what their distributional 
consequences are. Often capital income taxation is ruled out as a means 
of subsidy financing as it would defeat the purpose of enhancing growth. 
As an example see Bertola (1993), p. 1192. He does, however, analyze 
the effect of consumption taxes on growth and distribution.
In this paper and within an infinite-horizon, endogenous growth 
framework it is questioned whether (1 ) high capital income taxes are 
always bad for growth, (2) the optimal policies of the accumulated factor 
of production are necessarily growth maximizing, (3) shifting political 
power to the non-accumulated factor of production causes higher taxes 
and lower growth and (4) capital income taxation really does defeat the 
purpose of enhancing growth.1
In the model a capital income cum. investment subsidy tax scheme
'A  negative answer to the first question is e.g. provided by Uhlig and Yanagawa 
(1996) in a finite-horizon OLG growth model. More generally, and for infinite-horizon 
OLG growth models. Bertola (1996) shows that shifting income towards the non- 
accumulated factor of production mav raise growth. However, he concludes that 
redistributing disposable income from accumulated to non-accumulated factors of 
production necessarily decreases the level and/or growth rate of income in infini.tr- 
horizon growth models. (Cf. Bertola (1998), p. 27: (1996), p. 1552.) But, for instance. 
Rehme (1995) or. in a different context, Pelloni and Waldmann (1997) show that the 
redistribution argument may also apply within ’standard', infinite-horizon growth 




























































































(CICIST) is compared with a wealth tax scheme (W T). The tax schemes 
are meant to represent two broad classes of tax arrangements that may 
distort the investors’ incentive to accumulate and both serve as metaphors 
for redistributive mechanisms. For the same assumption with respect to 
W T and examples of what other redistributive mechanisms WT may 
capture see Alesina and Rodrik (1991), (1994). In these papers policies 
that maximize growth are optimal for the accumulated factor of produc­
tion. Thus, W T may also serve as a metaphor for models leading to that 
result. In contrast, CICIST is a metaphor for any redistributive, perhaps 
accumulation reducing policy that, in addition, subsidizes investment. 
Thus, CICIST is supposed to reflect the fact that in one way or another 
some governments subsidize investment more than others.2
In this paper and as is common, the non-accumulated factor of pro­
duction is identified with labour and the accumulated factor is identified 
with capital. The model uses an important equivalence result due to 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) by assuming that the tax rate on capital 
income and for investment subsidies is equal. Thus, the tax scheme is 
tantamount to a tax on the consumption of the capital owners.3 Suppose 
the government provides public inputs to production as in Barro (1990). 
Higher capital income taxes may then be good for the pre-tax return on 
capital if the public inputs positively affect production. Coupled with
2A  society’s choice of tax scheme depends on many diverse things such {is history, 
politics, institutions etc. Although the paper argues that tax schemes play a great 
role in any analysis of the relationship between taxes and growth, an answer to the 
question why societies prefer one scheme to another one has to remain outside of this 
paper’s analysis.
3In terms of implementability there are important differences, however. As a 
consumption tax the government would tax the capital owners’ consumption so that 
a government representing their interests would not necessarily want to use it. On 
the other hand a pro-labour government may wish to use it. For both governments it 
would be difficult to determine whether a homogeneous consumption good was bought 
by a capital owner or a worker. So viewing the tax arrangement as a consumption tax 
raises various difficulties which do not arise when implemented as a capital income cum 
investment subsidy scheme. The conditions for the optimality of uniform commodity 
taxation have e.g. been analyzed by Sandmo (1976), or Besley and Jewitt (1995). For 
recent contributions on the relationship between consumption and (capital) income 





























































































an investment subsidy, a ’right-wing’ (entirely pro-capitalists') govern­
ment may want to use the tax scheme. Analogous reasoning holds for a 
’left-wing’ (entirely pro-workers’) government.
The uniform tax rate may be justified as follows: Given everything 
else a ’right-wing’ government would wish to set very low capital income 
taxes. But higher tax rates may be called for if public services raise the 
return on capital, and if the government wants to subsidize investment . 
So setting similar tax rates on capital income and for investment subsidies 
is a reasonable choice for a ’right-wing’ government. Similarly, a ’left- 
wing’ government would wish to set a high tax rate for redistributive 
reasons. But that hinders investment, and is bad for the growth of wages. 
Thus, a left-wing government would have to strike a balance between 
financing investment subsidies and redistribution. Hence, setting similar 
tax rates is also a reasonable choice for a ’left-wing’ government. With 
these justifications and for simplicity a uniform, tax rate on capital income 
and for investment subsidies is assumed.
In the paper the governments may want to expropriate the capital 
stock and run the economy more efficiently themselves. As that is rather 
unrealistic, it is ruled out and each government respects the right of 
private property.
It is shown that for optimizing capital owners the distorting effect 
of capital income taxes is removed by the investment subsidy and the 
positive effect of public inputs to production. The capital income tax 
only has a negative effect on the capital owners’ consumption level. In 
the economy’s market equilibrium steady state growth depends only on 
the pre-tax return to capital.
In the paper the equilibrium relationship between pre-tax factor in­
comes and taxes as well as growth and taxes is strictly positive. However, 
the capital income component of the share of disposable income in total 
income decreases with taxes while that for the wage component remains 
fixed. Thus, higher taxes redistribute relatively more income to labour 
and raise growth. Furthermore, growth is maximized, when the capi­
talists are taxed maximally. It is shown that CICIST allows for higher 




























































































same ratio of public inputs in production to the capital stock or if the 
capital owners are sufficiently impatient and a government targets the 
same ratio of tax revenues to tax base. Consequently. CICIST appears 
conducive to high growth.
In contrast to most optimal growth models impatience is not nec­
essarily bad for growth in the model and there is a concave relationship 
between the growth and the time preference rate. As the tax scheme 
operates like a consumption tax, more impatience raises the capital own­
ers’ instantaneous level of consumption and with it the tax revenues, the 
government channels into production which in turn raise the return on 
capital and growth. Furthermore, it is shown that the more impatient 
the capital owners are, the lower the capital income tax rate must be to 
maintain a given growth rate.
In a public policy analysis it is investigated what tax rates a welfare 
maximizing government would choose.4 In the model a time-consistent 
policy with non-zero capital income taxes is optimal. Furthermore, the 
optimal ’right-wing’ tax policy does not maximize growth under CICIST. 
As capital income taxes reduce the investors’ instantaneous consumption 
the ’right-wing’ government chooses a tax rate that represents the op­
timal trade-off between generating high income through raising enough 
tax revenues in order to raise the return on capital on the one hand while 
reducing consumption on the other hand.
Interestingly, the capital owners always prefer a wealth tax scheme 
under which they act growth maximizing. As growth may be higher un­
der this paper’s tax scheme, the preferred choice of the capital owners 
implies that they value the direct tax effect on their consumption level
4Thus, tiie paper contributes to discussions on optimal capital income taxation. In 
that literature some models argue in favour of zero long-run taxes on capital income 
as, for example, in Eaton (1981), Hamilton (1987), Judd (1985), Chamley (1985), 
(1986) or Lucas (1990), whereas others imply non-zero taxes as in e.g. Jones, Manuelli 
and Rossi (1993), (1997) or Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996). Analyzing the relationship 
between expenditure (consumption) and capital income taxes Atkinson and Sadmo 
(1980) identify conditions under which zero capital income taxes may yield first best 
allocations. On the same relationship, Judd (1999) shows that under more general 
conditions the optimal capital income tax should be zero on average. However, the 




























































































higher than the intertemporal effect of having higher income and con­
sumption in the future. The paper identifies conditions under which the 
capitalists’ preferred tax policies generate higher growth under this pa­
per’s scheme than under the wealth tax scheme. Hence, the accumulated 
factor of production may not choose the growth maximizing tax base and 
may therefore not act growth maximizing in comparison to a tax scheme 
where it would actually maximize growth.
Furthermore, if the social planner uses an income cum investment 
subsidy tax arrangement, placing more social weight on the welfare of 
the non-accumulated factor of production (workers) raises the optimal 
tax rate on the income of the accumulated factor of production (capital) 
and through this the growth rate. Hence, it may not be optimal for 
high growth to shift all political power to the accumulated factor of 
production. The result is in direct contrast to what is shown in many 
models.5
The ’right-wing’ government acts like a growth maximizer under 
the wealth tax scheme. With this paper’s tax scheme a ’left-wing’ gov­
ernment acts like a growth maximizer. Thus, a switch in tax bases may 
induce an important switch in optimal policies. Hence, one may observe 
an economy with a government that represents only the interests of the 
non-accumulated factor of production (labour) to distribute income to 
that factor and have higher growth than an economy represented by a 
government solely concerned about the welfare of the accumulated factor 
of production (capital).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model 
set-up, and derives the market equilibrium. Section 2.1 provides a public 
policy analysis and compares optimal tax policies. Section 3 draws some 
conclusions.
5See e.g. Alesina and Rodrik (1994). A  result similar to this paper’s is obtained 
in Bertola (1993), but notice that in comparison to a wealth tax scheme taxation of 





























































































There are two types of many identical, price-taking, infinitely lived indi­
viduals who are all equally impatient. The capital owners (k) own capital 
equally and no labour, and the workers (IT) own labour equally, but no 
capital.6 Both groups derive logarithmic utility from the consumption of 
a homogeneous, malleable good. There are many firms which are owned 
by the capitalists. Aggregate output is produced by (raw) labour and 
capital according to a Barro (1990) production technology
Yt =  A K ? G]~a L\-a , 0 < a < 1 ( 1 )
where Yt is total output, K t is the real capital stock1, G, are total public 
inputs to production and A is a constant efficiency index, which depends 
on cultural, institutional and technological development. At each point 
in time (raw) labour is inelastically supplied and the total labour en­
dowment equals unity, Lt =  1- For simplicity the paper abstracts from 
problems arising from the depreciation of the capital stock.
The Public Sector. At each point in time the government taxes the 
capital income of and grants an investment tax subsidy to the capital
6This assumption uses a short-cut of a result in Bertola (1993). He lias shown 
in an endogenous growth model that for utility maximizing, infinitely lived agents 
who do not own initial capital, it is not optimal to save/invest out of wage income 
along a balanced growth path. Similarly, it is not optimal to work for those who only 
own capital initially. Thus, the model set-up is reminiscent of Kaldor (1956), where 
different proportions of profits and wages are saved. However, in Kaldorian models 
growth determines factor share incomes, whereas in endogenous growth models the 
direction is rather from factor shares to growth. Furthermore, the logic of the model 
would not change if instead one introduced a representative household who derives 
wage as well as capital income and makes investment decisions, and the government 
represented ’economic classes’ within that household.
Alternatively, one may assume that K, is broad capital and that human and 
physical capital are strict complements. For a justification of the latter approach 
see, for instance, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), p. 416. Both assumptions would 
allow one to concentrate on the distributional conflict between the accumulated and 





























































































owning households at the rate 9,. The tax arrangement amounts to a 
tax; on the capitalist owners’ consumption, which is implemented as a 
capital income cum investment subsidy tax (CICST).8 The government 
runs a balanced budget at each point in time and uses the tax revenues 
to provide public services that feed back into production
Gt =  8t[rtK t -  K t] (2)
where the RHS denotes tax revenues net of investment subsidies. By 
assumption it is impossible to tax all capital income, that is, 9, E [0,1 — e] 
where e is small.9 Letting 7  =  notice that is constant over time 
when rt — 7  and 9t =  0.
The Private Sector. The firms operate in a perfectly competitive 
environment, maximize profits, and take Gt as given. The capital owners 
rent capital to and demand shares of the firms, which are collateralized 
one-to-one by capital. The markets for assets, capital and labour clear 
at each point in time so that the firms face a path of uniform, market 
clearing rental rates for capital and labour. Given perfect competition 
the firms rent capital and hire labour in spot markets in each period. The 
price of output Yt serves as numeraire and is set equal to 1 at each date, 
implying that the price of capital Kt in terms of overall consumption stays 
at unity. Given constant returns to capital and labour, factor payments
8Thus, a Ramsey Tax Problem is contemplated. See Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) 
or Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), dipt. 12. In order to see the equivalence let q =  
1 +  tc where q is the price consumption goods command in terms of producer prices 
normalized to be one and fixed. The government taxes consumption at rate tc. Let 
Y k denote the capital owners’ pre-tax income minus pre-tax investment. Then a 
consumption tax is equivalent to an income cum investment tax if the capital owners’ 
budget constraints satisfy (1 +  tc)Ck =  Y k <=> Ck =  (1 — 8)Yk which is true if 
t =  - 2 -*C 1-0-
9A  small e captures that the upper bound on tax rates, consistent with no tax- 
induced expropriation, may still be large, that is, it may be close to, but it is less 
than one. For ease of calculations it is often assumed that e —1  0 when the effects of 
maximal taxation are analyzed. Then the reader should bear in mind that maximal 
taxation in this market economy model with private property is not meant to be the 




























































































exhaust output so that profit maximization implies
r t and w, - Ë 11dL, A',(3)
where Lt =  l,Vf. If jJ is constant over time, the marginal product of 
capital is constant, whereas the wages would grow with the capital stock. 
Note that the ratio of public inputs to the capital stock has a positive 
bearing on the pre-tax return on capital and (initial) wages.
The workers derive a utility stream from consuming their entire
roc
wages. Their intertemporal utility is given bv /  lnC," e~p'dt where
Jo
C f  =  wt. They do not invest and are not taxed by assumption.
At each period the capital owners choose how much of their income 
to consume or invest, and they take the paths of rt and 9t as given. Their 
instantaneous budget constraint is given by Cf' =  (1 — 9,) [r> K t — K t\ so 
that consumption depends on after-tax capital income minus after-tax 
investment.10
Rearranging the capital owners solve
max / In C,fc e ptdt 
Cf Jo (4)
s.t. it -  rtK t - (5)
*(0) = given, Jfc(oo) =  free. (6)
The present value Hamiltonian for this problem is U =  In C£ -I-p,t(rtK, —
Qk
where pt denotes the current value shadow price of one more unit 
of investment at date t. The necessary FOCs for the maximization of 
'H(-) are given by equations (5), (6) and
_L =  ^
Ctk 1 -  9, (7)
10Notice that the budget constraint suggests yet another implementation of the 
consumption tax. As Ctfc = (\-Q,)rtK t- K t+ 9 ,K t, the term 9tk t may be interpreted 
as a special form of politically determined capital depreciation allowance which is 




























































































Pt =  ptp -  rtpt 
lim K tpte~pt — 0.
( 8 )
(9)
where the transversality condition (9) ensures that the present value of 
the capital stock approaches zero asymptotically. In Appendix A it is 
shown that in the optimum
Thus, in the model the growth rate of wealth 7 depends on the pre­
tax return on capital, because the capital owners have perfect foresight 
and know that they receive an investment subsidy. I11 the optimum the 
distorting effect of capital income taxation is exactly offset by the accu­
mulation inducing effect of the investment subsidy. The distorting effect 
is, however, present in the capital owners’ instantaneous level of con­
sumption, which follows the rule C* = (1 — 9t)pKt. More impatience 
causes the capital owners to value current consumption more than fu­
ture consumption, which makes them consume more per units of capital. 
Furthermore, an increase in 9t reduces the capital owners’ instantaneous 
consumption per units of capital at each date t. But then consumption 
grows at 7Ck =  4̂ = 7 — which does not equal 7 in general. How­
ever, when 9t is constant, then 7  =  7C. In that case is constant, so 
that 7  =  f t =  0. This will be the case in equilibrium as shown below.
Market Equilibrium. For arbitrary paths of 9t the economy’s re­
source constraint is satisfied at each date if It =  Yt — Ct — Gt where 
Ct =  Cfw +  Cf. Private sector optimality requires 7  =  ^  =  rt — p so 
that in equilibrium the government’s budget constraint becomes
K t (10)




























































































Hence, for arbitrary paths of 6t the equilibrium factor rewards in (3) 
equal
rt — aA[6tp]l~a and wt =  r){Ot)K t =  [\ -  a)A[6,p)l~nI\t. ( 12 )
Notice that rt and rp are continuous, increasing and concave in 6,. Thus, 
higher tax rates raise the return on capital and (initial) wages. Surpris­
ingly the marginal products depend on preference parameters. But that 
is, of course, due to the fact that in a model with productive govern­
ment inputs and a tax scheme that operates like a consumption tax the 
marginal products should clearly depend on preference parameters. Also, 
the return on capital is higher the more impatient the investors are. More 
impatience makes the capital owners consume more per units of capital, 
which increases the tax revenues that are channelled into production only 
to raise the return on capital and growth.11
From the production function one verifies for given G, that Y, — 
rtK t +  wt, since Lt — 1 . Thus, the economy’s resource constraint is 
satisfied if
It =  K t =  rtK t +  wt -  C f -  C f  -  6tpKt. (13)
But private sector optimality entails K, =  j K t =  (rt — p) K t, C f =  
(1 -  9t)pKt and Cfv =  rj(8t)K t so that the resource constraint is met 
and the economy is in equilibrium at each point in time. However, over 
time and for arbitrary paths of 0t the economic aggregates may grow at 
different rates. Growth will only be balanced when the tax policies are 
constant over time.
To put more structure on the tax policies consider a government 
that wants to maximize the growth of any aggregate variable featuring 
in the overall resource constraint. In Appendix B the following is shown:
u In Appendix E it is shown that for constant policies and the more general case of 
iso-elastic utility with preference for consumption smoothing the return on capital is 
also increasing in p, that is, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consump­
tion between different dates varies between zero and one, more impatience raises the 




























































































Proposition 1 At each point m time the growth rates of output, wage or 
capital income, the capital owners’ or workers’ consumption, capital or 
government expenditure are each maximized by the constant policy which 
taxes capital income at its maximum rate, 6t =  1 — e.
Clearly, growth maximizing policies are bad for the capital own­
ers as they reduce their consumption to a level close to zero. Hence, 
for the capital owners it has very different welfare implications whether 
the government maximizes the level or the growth of their consumption. 
Another, perhaps more surprising implication is that the paper’s capital 
income tax scheme calls for maximal taxation of the reproducible factor 
of production, if the objective is to maximize growth of the aggregates 
above, which are often considered in the literature.
Next, consider disposable income Ytd — [(r( -  Otp)K t] +  [rjtK t] as 
given from (13). Expressed in terms of total income (^output.) and for 
constant policies one gets =  [a — ] +  [1 -  a] which decreases
in 6t. Thus, higher taxes reduce overall disposable income in terms of 
total income. This reduction is completely due to the capital income 
component ((0)  =  [a — because the wage component remains
constant at 1 — a. Thus and in relative terms, higher taxes redistribute 
income towards labour, but they also raise balanced growth, as 7  is 
strictly increasing in taxes.12
Comparison to a Wealth Tax Market Equilibrium. Let technol­
ogy, preferences etc. be as in this paper with the only difference that the 
government taxes wealth. In such a framework Alesina and Rodrik show 
that a constant tax policy is optimal for the governments they consider. 
Thus, assume that governments pursue constant tax policies.13 The cap­
italists’ dynamic budget constraint is then given by C!f =  (r — r)k t — kt 
where r  is the tax rate, levied on the capital owners’ wealth. Solving a
12Below and for W T  one verifies that £ (r) is also decreasing, but growth is concave 
in t . Furthermore, any government attaching social weight to the non-accumulated 
factor of production will choose r >  f  in which case there is a positive relation between 
£(t ) and growth. See Lemma 2 below.




























































































problem analogous to the one presented above implies j (t) — r(r) — r — p. 
where r(r) =  aA  (^ -) , Gt — tK, and growth is concave in r. Denote
7 (9) and 7(7-) as the growth rate under CICIST or WT, respectively. 
Suppose the government maintains the same ratio of G, to I\, for all 1 
under either tax scheme. Then
Proposition 2 If the government maintains the same ratio of G, to K, 
under either tax scheme, > 0 for all t, then the pre-tax
returns on capital are equal, r(9) =  r(r), but growth is higher under the 
capital income tax cum investment subsidy tax than under the wealth tax 
scheme, 7 (6) > 7 (r).
Thus, a government may fare better in terms of growth with CI­
CIST. Notice that the result would be qualitatively the same if the gov­
ernment fixed ^  instead.
The return on capital depends on the rate of time preference in the 
model (Ramsey result) and so it is interesting to know under what other 
conditions the ratio result holds. Suppose a government would target the 
same ratio of tax revenues to tax base under either tax scheme.14 That 
would imply 6 — r. But then 7 (9) > 7 (r) if
aA(8py~a — p > aA  (r )1-a — r  — p
The growth maximizing wealth tax rate is r =  [a(l — a )^ ]°  =  f .  If 
9 =  t then the condition amounts to p >  q 1̂ .
Proposition 3 If the government targets the same ratio of tax revenues 
to tax base under either tax scheme, then 6 — t . Furthermore, if the 
agents are sufficiently impatient, p > and 9 =  t , where r  maxi­
mizes 7 (r), then 7 (0)|fl=f > 7 (r)|r=f so that growth would be higher under 
CICIST than under WT.





























































































Figure 1 below visualizes the result for the case where the conditions 
for the proposition hold.
With sufficient impatience CIC1ST generates higher growth than 
WT. The model’s tax scheme neither generates an inverted U-shaped 
(Barro (1990) or Alesina and Rodrik (1994)) nor a U-shaped relationship 
(Persson and Tabellini (1994)) between growth and taxes. Instead, it is 
strictly positive. The reason is that in terms of growth the positive effect 
of granting investment subsidies outweighs the negative effect of levying 
taxes on capital income. In contrast to most optimal growth models 
(e.g. Cass (1965) or Koopmans (1965)) impatience (higher p) is not nec­
essarily bad for growth in this model. For given tax policies growth is 
first increasing and then decreasing in the rate of time preference p, and 
maximized if
Thus, for given policy and when p < p*, growth could be higher if the 
agents discounted future utility more. In that situation an increase in 
impatience would raise growth. Furthermore, given that 7  is concave in 
p, it is possible that two economies have identical technologies, pursue 
the same policies and exhibit the same growth performance, although






























































































the agents in one economy are more impatient than in another economy. 
Notice that a higher 0 requires a higher p*.
P roposition  4 Assume that the tax policies are given. Under the wealth 
tax scheme growth, 7 (r), is maximized if p is very small. Under the cap­
ital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme growth, 7(0). is concave 
in p and maximized if the rate of time preference equals p*.
The model’s tax arrangement is equivalent to a tax on the capi­
tal owners’ consumption which depends positively on their rate of time 
preference. Thus, if the capital owners are more impatient, they will 
choose higher consumption (per units of capital) and that raises the tax 
revenues available to the government. The revenues in turn may be used 
to provide productive services, thereby raising the return on capital and 
growth .
Note that 7 ( f )  =  f  — p and f  — [a(l -  c*)/!]". Thus, for
7 (0) =  7  (t)
a A  [0pŸ~a
a f  
1 — a
, that is 9 =
1
f  1_ 
(1 - a ) A
1
p'
Lem m a 1 If 6 = i ,  then 7 (6») =  7 (f).
Thus, there is an interesting trade-off between the tax rate and the 
time preference rate for given growth. The more impatient the capital 
owners are, the lower the taxes have to be for maintaining a given growth 
rate. Again that is due to the fact that more impatient capital owners 
consume more, but also generate higher tax revenues used for productive 
services.
2.1 Public Policy Analysis
The government cares about the workers or the capital owners. Respect­





























































































W  =  (1 -  /?) V r(Ctk) +  (3 Y\C]V) (14)
where V r, V  are the intertemporal utility indices of the capital owners 
and workers, respectively. The parameter (3 E [0,1] represents the welfare 
weight attached to the two groups. The constancy of f3 is justified by 
interpreting it as reflecting the political and socio-economic institutions 
in the economy. Then the fact that governments alternate in office is 
less of an issue since institutional features are usually constant for long 
periods of time. If /3 — 1(0), the government is ’left-wing’ ( ’right-wing’) 
and cares about the workers (capital owners) only.
Alesina and Rodrik show that the optimal policies maximizing (14) 
under W T are constant and characterized by the following:
Lemma 2 (Alesina and Rodrik) Under the wealth tax scheme the op­
timal policies which maximize W ( t) are such that
1. the growth rate, 7 (r), is inversely related to the social weight at­
tached to welfare of the workers, (3.
2. the policy, which is optimal for the capital owners, i.e. when (3 — 0, 
is given by t =  t , maximizes growth and depends on technological 
parameters only.
Thus, under W T a government placing more weight on the welfare 
of the non-accumulated factor of production chooses a higher than the 
growth maximizing ( ’right-wing’) tax rate.
For CICIST it is now shown that a government maximizing W(6t) 
chooses a constant policy. Thus, let the government solve
max jT ° ((1 -  (3) In Cf +  B In C f ) e~ptdt (15)
s.t. C f -  (1 -  et)pKt (16)
C f  -  tl(0t)Kt (17)




























































































plus the private sector optimality and the equilibrium conditions, which 
feature in 7*, r, and T]t. The last equation implies Kt =  A'0p h i S u b ­
stitution of the constraints into the objective function (15) implies
((1 -  0) In ((1  -  0t)pKoef< '^ j +  0ln (t,(9,) e~p,dt.
Simplification and collecting terms yields 
Jo ((1  ~  0) In ((1 -  9t)pK0) + ~i„ds +  /31n (v{9t) A'0) j  e~'"dt.







7  te ~'*dt.






fo lads io° lads
=  lim fÓ lads
pept <—>000 pept pef0 <—>00 pe''1
and [  7 (6(s))ds < f 7 (0, =  1 )ds — t'y(l). Under the assumption that 
Jo Jo
9(t) is continuous in t and by the concavity of j(6) the limit expression 
exists. (Thus, there are no jumps or points of discontinuity.) Further­




fo lads =  lim It
pept <-400 p2ept
=  0.
Hence, J  'y.idsj e ptdt =  ~ JQ 7te ptdt. But then the govern-
ment’s objective function reduces to




























































































The integral has the structure f f f  F(Ot, 9,.9)dt and for its maxi­
mization the necessary Euler equation Fgt — — 0 is given by — \ ^  +
— -Ç— -r-f- +  — 0. Evaluating the derivatives yields
p dr, dO, d9, T],
i - e ,
i - e t +  q (1 -  a)A[6tp] “  +  0  )  =  °- (19)
But the 6, solving this equation depends on constants only so that a time- 
invariant policy is optimal. Clearly, 9t =  0 does not solve the equation. 
Thus, the economy is characterized by stead}' state, balanced growth at. 
the rate 7 .
Lem m a 3 The government’s optimal policy is time-invariant so that the 
economy exhibits steady state, balanced growth. Zero taxation of capital 
income is never optimal under the capital income cum investment subsidy 
tax scheme.
For constant policies one verifies that
W(6) =  ( l -/ 3 )
ln[(l — 6>)pi^0] | ^ ln[rj K 0] +
p p p2'
( 20)
Notice that the optimal tax rate 6 — f (a ,  A, p, /3) is unique, because 
W (0) is concave as 7gg < 0 so that W (6) is a sum of concave functions.15
From equation (19) the 9 chosen by a right-wing (/3 — 0) govern­
ment satisfies
P
where f  is the growth maximizing wealth tax rate. Let 9r denote the 
solution to the equation above. It is obvious that 9 — 1 (e —> 0) does not 
solve the equation and that 9r is decreasing in the time preference rate.




























































































P roposition  5 A right-wing (0 =  0) government does not maximiz
growth and its optimal tax rate is determined by 0r =  
and decreases in the rate of time preference, p.
f  (1 -  0’ )" < 1
The intuition for 9r < 1 is not difficult to understand. On the one 
hand the right-wing government wants to set a high tax rate, as that is 
good for the capital owners’ income level and growth, which positively 
affects the capitalists’ utility. On the other hand higher taxes reduce 
their consumption, which negatively affects their utility. 9r represents 
the optimal trade-off for this problem.
Whereas under the W T the optimal right-wing policy is indepen­
dent of preferences, 9T pays attention to technology and the intertemporal 
preferences of the capital owners. Surprisingly, it is optimal for patient 
capital owners to be taxed more heavily in the model. The reason is that 
patient capital owners consume too little, generating not enough tax rev­
enues for productive government inputs in production. To compensate 
for that the right-wing government chooses higher taxes to obtain the 
growth rate which is optimal for the capital owners’ welfare.
ft is an interesting question whether the capital owners are better 
off under this paper’s tax scheme or under WT. In appendix C it is 
shown that the capital owners’ welfare under W T is given by Vr(r) =  
ln̂ A°  ̂ +  Under C1C1ST the highest welfare to be obtained by the 
capital owners is V r(9r) and under W T it is V r(f).  The model implies 
V r(9r) < V t(t) because V r(9) < V r(r) holds if
ln [( l -9 )p K „ ]  +  B  < () ^  ( ] _ e ) e B < 1
P P P
where B =  lifhplll. Notice that eB =  +  +  Then a sufficient
condition for the last inequality to hold is (1 +  5 )  < y ^ , that is, 5  < 
Thus, V(9) < V ( t) if




























































































Evaluate the last inequality at f  and 6r. which are two numbers, note 
that 6r p — f (  1 — 9r)â from equation (2 1 ) and substitute for 0rp above 
to obtain
a .4 f1-“ (l -  6r) Lîr -  a A f1-0 +  f  < ^  ~  ̂ ^
Divide by f ,  note f a — q (1 — a)A,  and simplify to get
^  ---------- —  +  1 < ( l - ( T ) o - 1 ^  ( l - ® r) i < l - Â r
1 -  a  1 — a
which is true so that indeed Vr(f)  > V r(6r). Hence,
P roposition  6 The capital owners’ optimal policies under either tax 
scheme imply that they would prefer the wealth tax scheme to the capital 
income cum investment subsidy tax scheme.
The result may not look very surprising if one recalls that CICIST 
works like a tax on the capital owners’ consumption reducing their utility. 
However, the growth rate may be higher under the paper’s capital income 
tax scheme. Thus, the result establishes that the capital owners value 
the direct effect on their consumption level higher than the intertemporal 
effect of having higher income and so higher consumption in the future.
The right-wing government represents the accumulated factor of 
production and acts growth maximizing under WT, but does not do so 
under CICIST. However, for a wide range of parameter values the optimal 
policy for the capital owners under this model’s tax scheme generates 
higher growth. Thus, even though a right-wing government does not 
maximize growth under CICIST its policy may generate a higher growth 
rate than under WT. If 7 (9) > 7 (f),  then 6 > 1-0 I by Lemma
1 . Substitution of 6r — )o yields
f ( l  — 0r)« >
\ \ - a ) A





























































































that is, (1 — Or) > a ~ * . Whether this inequality holds is not easily ana­
lyzed analytically, but the following table presents a numerical simulation 
showing that there exist parameter values for which 7
Numerical Simulation for . 4 = 1
P a f r 7 (f) A
1 . 0.01 0.25 0.001 0.086 -0.010 -0.009 +
2 . 0.01 0.50 0.063 0.672 0.053 0.032 -
3. 0.01 0.75 0.107 0.851 0.312 0.218 -
4. 0.05 0.25 0.001 0.023 -0.050 -0.049 +
5. 0.05 0.50 0.063 0.420 0.013 0.023 +
6. 0.05 0.75 0.107 0.611 0.272 0.263 -
7. 0.10 0.25 0.001 0.012 -0.100 -0.099 +
8. 0.10 0.50 0.063 0.303 -0.038 - 0.013 +
9. 0.10 0.75 0.107 0.466 0.222 0.248 +
where A =  sgn ( ŷ(9r) — 7 ( f )).16 From the table and for given a an 
increase in p causes the right-wing policy to generate higher growth under 
CICIST than under WT. A similar conclusion can be reached for given 
p and increases in a.
P roposition  7 3 a, A and p such that 7 ( f )  < /y(9r) so that the pre­
ferred policy of the accumulated factor of production may generate higher 
growth under the capital income cum subsidy tax than under the wealth 
tax scheme.
The proposition casts doubt on models that identify growth max­
imizing and optimal policies of the owners of the accumulated factor of




























































































production. In this model the owners of the accumulated factor of pro­
duction prefer a wealth tax scheme (Proposition 6) and a government rep­
resenting their interests acts growth maximizing under that scheme. But 
that choice is not growth maximizing in comparison to a tax scheme that 
the accumulated factor owners would not choose and under which their 
optimal policy is not growth maximizing, but may still generate higher 
growth than under the accumulated factor owners’ preferred (wealth) tax 
scheme (Proposition 7). Hence, the model provides an example that the 
owners of the accumulated factor of production do not always choose a 
growth maximizing tax base.
Next, it is shown that an increase in /3, that is, an increase in the 
weight attached to the welfare of the non-accumulated factor of produc­
tion (workers) increases the optimal 9. If (3 >  0 then 9 solves (19) so that 
W(9(0), f3)g — 0. Totally differentiate with respect to (3 to obtain17
B9
Wee gjj +  w ep =  0.
Concavity of W(6)  entails Wee < 0. Notice that from (20)
W9P =
1 — Q
+  —-—  >  o
( l - 0 ) p  9p





























































































M  =   ̂ Q
dp \ v (eu
so that any optimal 9 is increasing in /3. But an increase in l3 also raises 
the growth rate since 7# > 0. Thus,
Proposition 8 An increase in /3 raises 9 and 7 {9).
This is an important result and in direct contrast to Lemma 2. If 
the social planner uses the CICIST arrangement, placing more weight 
(higher (3) on the welfare of the non-accumulated factor of production 
(workers) raises the optimal tax rate on the income of the accumulated 
factor of production (capital) and through this the growth rate. Hence, 
under CICIST it is not optimal for high growth to shift all political power 
to the accumulated factor of production.18
From (20) one readily verifies We((3 =  1) > 0 for a left-wing gov­
ernment.
Proposition 9 A left-wing government sets 9l — 1 — e and maximizes 
growth.
Under W T a right-wing government acts like a growth maximizer
in the optimum. In contrast, under CICIST a left-wing government acts
18A similar result is obtained in Bertola (1993), but notice that taxation of capital 




























































































like a growth maximizer. Thus, a switch from YVT to CICIST induces an 
important switch in optimal policies. In particular, it makes a right and 
left-wing government switch roles in terms of who maximizes growth.
3 Conclusion
Three points that are often made in the theoretical literature on growth 
and distributive policies. First, increasing taxes for redistributive pur­
poses slows down growth. Second, the optimal policies of the accumu­
lated factor of production can be identified with growth maximization. 
Third, capital income taxation defeats the purpose of enhancing growth 
when used as a means to finance investment subsidies.
This paper challenges all three points by showing that maximal 
taxation of the accumulated factor of production may be growth maxi­
mizing, the non-accumulated factor of production may act growth maxi­
mizing, and capital income taxes are not necessarily bad instruments for 
investment subsidy financing.
The model analyzes a capital income cum investment subsidy tax 
scheme which operates like a tax on the capital owners’ consumption. 
The paper argues that the implementability of the tax scheme can be 
justified for ’right-wing’ and ’left-wing’ governments. It is shown that for 
optimizing agents the investment subsidies remove the distorting effect 




























































































positively on the pre-tax return to capital. Impatience is not necessarily 
bad for growth in the model and it is growth maximizing to tax capital 
income maximally. The reason is that the tax scheme operates like a 
consumption tax. More impatience causes the capital owners to consume 
more, raising the government’s tax revenues that are channelled into 
production as public inputs, thereby raising the return to capital and 
growth.
In a public policy analysis the optimal policies under the model’s 
tax scheme are compared with those generated under a wealth tax scheme. 
The paper implies that a ’right-wing’ government does not maximize 
growth under the model’s tax scheme, although it does so under the 
wealth tax scheme which it prefers. But the capital owners’ optimal 
( ’right-wing’ ) policy under the model’s tax scheme may generate higher 
growth than their optimal, growth maximizing policy under the wealth 
tax scheme. Thus, the paper shows that the preferred policy of the ac­
cumulated factor of production is not always good for growth.
Furthermore, it is shown that placing more weight on the welfare 
of the nom accumulated factor of production (workers) leads the social 
planner to raise the optimal tax rate on the income of the accumulated 
factor of production (capital) and through this the growth rate. Hence, 
under this paper’s tax arrangement it is not optimal for high growth to 
shift all political power to the accumulated factor of production.




























































































the model. Thus, a switch in tax schemes may induce an important 
switch in optimal policies. The results imply that due to differences in 
tax arrangements one may observe an economy with a government that 
represents only the interests of the non-accumulated factor of produc­
tion (labour) to have higher growth than an economy represented by a 
government solely concerned about the accumulated factor of production 
(capital).
Several caveats apply. The set-up of the model has been highly 
aggregated. In reality workers own capital and capital owners supply 
labour. It would be desirable to know more about how exactly the gov­
ernment achieves targeting personal investment. These and other prob­




























































































A The capital owners’ optimum
By equation (8) the shadow price evolves according to =  p(l e~ -H> 
where /i(l is a positive constant which equals HjA Then the transversality 
condition (9) boils down to
Ho lini e - f ó (r’ -fi)d-K t e- pt
t —> OC
=  po lim K, e
t —>OC
— If r s (i.s Jo — o.
Let Dt =  . Equations (7) and (8) imply that "id =  — rt ~ P-
Hence, actual consumption Cf grows at
Ctk _  Dt 9t 
C? D, 1 - 6 t (Al)
At any date Dt is described by Dt =  Dq e * where A) remains to
be determined. Substituting for Dt in (5) implies
K t =  rtKt -  A, e f > ’ - p)ds
which is a first order, linear differential equation in K t. It is solved as 
follows
K t — rtK t =  - D 0 e - l> '-p)ds 
e- fÓr’ d3 [ k t -  rtK t) =  —e~ r‘ ds Do ef«{r’ - p)ds 




























































































The last equation is an exact differential equation with integrating factor 
e~ I> r' rf'\ The LffS is solved by K, e~ fur’ d" 4- l>„ and the RHS is solved 
by ^  e~pt +  bi, where bn,bi are arbitrary constants. Thus,
K t =  —  eJo(r'~p)ds +  b eio ’ ■>h (A 2)
P




^  efo<r’ - p)d' +  b eJoT' d‘l'j — I*rs ds ° ./o lim/—>oo =  (1
which holds if the arbitrary constant b equals zero. Then equation (A2) 
becomes
Kt =  —  efo(r’ - p)dt 
P
Kt
K t 7 D =  r,
so that Dt and wealth K t grow at the same rate in the optimum. Fur­
thermore, in the optimum instantaneous consumption is determined by 
the rule Dt =  pKt so that C f =  (1 — Ot)pKt. If 0t is constant, then 





























































































B Growth maximizing policies
Recall 7 =  jM- =  rt — p. For all other variables let 7, denote the growth 
rate of variable i. Then one verifies that
7c = 7 + %, 7y =  IrK = 7vK = 7c "  = 7 + 7c* = 7 - 7 1^ •
Notice that the workers’ consumption grows at the same rate as wage, 
capital or total income. All these growth rates are in general time de­
pendent and have the structure 7 A government that wants to 
maximize the growth of these aggregates solves19
max7i(8t,6t,t) s.t. 6t < 1 -  e (B l)
Ot
Suppose 6t < 1 — e for all t . Then a necessary condition for a maximum is 
that the Euler equation ^  -  d /dt =  0 holds. Notice that ^  > 0. 
For 7y,7G ,7c'’' the derivative expression ^  — d {j/fjj') /dt is given by
(<h_ _  c j /A  _  ( _  ^7
[ d 0 t &f )  {  0} ) -  d»t
where ct is a positive constant. The derivative is positive so that the 
Euler equation is not satisfied. Furthermore, it does not hold for 7C*
19For a discussion of inequality constraints in calculus of variation problems see 





























































































/  d'y Ô, \ _  /  0, \ _  dq
( i - < ? , ) V  l  ( i - W ~  de,
is also positive. But as ^  > 0, growth at any point in time is highest 
when 6, =  1 — e. Hence, at each date growth of K ,,Y , , C f, C," , ijtK t,rtK t 
or Gt is maximized by the time invariant policy =  1 — c for all t .
C Welfare measures
In the steady state, balanced growth equilibrium j (6)  and y(r) are con­
stant. The workers’ and capital owners’ intertemporal welfare is given by 
/(| In C( e~pt where j  — k,W.  Let t —► oo and use integration by parts. 
For this define v2 =  In C{, dv\ — e~ptdt. Recall that Ck =  (1 — 0)pKt 
and C\v =  nKt under CICIST. Then dv2 =  pj =  j (0)  and constant in 
steady state, and V \ =  — ~p e ~ pt so that
r  In d  e~pt dt =  I f -  In C\ e~pl\°° +  -  [° °  7  e~pt dt
J 0 p [ Jo pJo
Evaluation at the particular limits and substitution for Cq yields the 
expressions of V r, V l in (20). Under WT the capital owners’ budget 




























































































in steady state is given by Ck =  pl\t. Proceeding as above with -)(r) 
instead of 7 (0) gives the expression for V ’ (t) in the text.
D Numerical Simulation Procedure
I have defined the following variables in Mathematica
t := (a*(l - a)*A)~a"(-1) 
gt := -rho - t + a*A*t"(l - a) 
gth := -rho + a*A*(rho*th)“(1 - a)
c := FindRoot[ths*rho - t*(l - ths)"(l/a) == 0, {ths, 0}] 
tst :=(1 - th) - a~(a/(l - a))
where th — 9, t =  f ,  gt — 7 (f) and gth — 7 (9). Setting . 4 = 1  and 
for given values of a  and p I have calculated ths =  0'\ set ths =  th and 
calculated gt and gth, recording the values in the table. I have checked, 
but not recorded, the results with calculating tst.
E Iso-elastic utility
Suppose the capital owners have the instantaneous utility function
U(Ctk) = c\~v - 1
1 -  V




























































































where the constant a =  £ represents the elasticity of intertemporal sub­
stitution. If p —> 1, !/(•) reduces to logarithmic utility. A high ;/ implies 
a low elasticity intertemporal substitution, low a. This means that the 
capital owners like to smooth consumption. In contrast, a high elasticity 
of substitution implies that the investors are indifferent to the timing of 
consumption. In that case the agents may defer consumption for a long 
time while investing in order to consume a large amount at a future date. 
By restricting v > 1 such behaviour is ruled out, implying a G (0, l ) .2(l 
Notice that a high time preference rate p implies that the investors value 
future consumption less than current consumption.
Assume tax policy is constant and the capital owners solve a prob­
lem similar to the one in the text under the dynamic budget constraint 
Cf =  (1 — 9) \rKt — Kf j. It is not difficult to verify (see also e.g. Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chpt. 2.1.2) that the steady state, balanced 
growth rate in a market equilibrium with arbitrary and constant tax rates 
is given by
7 =
r — p 
v
cr(r -  p). (E2)
20Notice that steady growth and a constant interest rate are consistent with many 
(v, p) pairs of (unobservable) preference parameters. However, Hall (1988) infers from 
aggregate variability in the growth rates of consumption and interest rates that a is 
much lower than unity in reality. For a similar argument see Bertola (199G), ftn. (>. 
Thus, for the argument the paper wants to make it may suffice to show that the model 




























































































Then the optimal level of consumption is determined by
Cf =  (1  -  9)[r - i\Kt =  (1  -  6) [(1 -  a)r + ap] I\,
where K t =  Thus, a and p have an effect on both the level
and growth of the capital owners’ consumption. For given 0 and r an 
increase in p (more impatience) or a decrease in a (more consumption 
smoothing) lower the growth rate and raise the fraction jt-, that is, the 
capital owners’ steady state consumption per units of capital. Thus, more 
impatience or consumption smoothing make the capitalists less willing 
to save for given taxes and given and r.
From the balanced budget condition (2) one gets
b =  =  9 (r -  7 ) =  9{r -  a(r -  p)).
In equilibrium r =  a A (ft)1-" so that 6 is implicitly defined by
b =  9 [(1 — cr)a;A61_a +  <rpj <=> ba =  6 [(1 — a)aA  +  crp6'>_1j .
As (a6“_1)6 =  (9ap( 1 — a)ba~2)b is in general only satisfied if b =  0, the 
fraction ^  must be constant. Define x =  ba — 9 [(1 — a)aA  +  ap fea_1] 
then Xb =  ab‘'~l — 9ap(a — l)6n~2 > 0 for all b £ (0,1). One also 
verifies that xp < 0 so that ^  > 0 and hence ^  > 0. Also, x„ — 




























































































of an increase in er on b and r is generally ambiguous. However, for 
sufficiently large p it is positive.
Hence, for iso-elastic utility with preference for consumption smooth­
ing, a E (0, 1 ), higher p or an increase in a when p is sufficiently large 
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